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A B S T R A C T   
In 2017 the Japanese government reported that its state-owned mining company had successfully extracted zinc 
from the seabed off the coast of Okinawa. This piloting of technology is currently the world’s only example of 
large-scale extractive activity operating at such depths. Alongside Japan’s innovations, the global deep sea 
mining (DSM) industry is moving towards commercial viability. This paper draws upon critical theoretical 
perspectives to better understand the complex debates being provoked. While there has been an increasing range 
of scholarship focusing on DSM from both the natural and social sciences, this paper cautions that the social 
sciences are not merely tools for assessing public and stakeholder acceptability. They require and deserve a 
central role in defining the purpose, nature and scope of commercial DSM. This paper therefore develops an 
approach that seeks to diversify and broaden engagements with DSM and that is well-placed to navigate the 
political questions that emerge from mining on the seabed. These perspectives also enable us to interrogate 
claims that DSM offers greater ‘sustainability’ than terrestrial mining does. This paper’s interdisciplinary 
approach draws on empirical reference to, and examples from, the Japanese context, highlighting four main 
areas of concern for DSM: geography, geopolitics, law and political economy. These areas of critical enquiry 
reveal DSM’s complexities and caution against perceiving DSM as a singular phenomenon. The emergent com-
plex and multi-scalar questions from seabed mining therefore require a more holistic approach. Mining the 
seabed produces, and is underpinned by, a multitude of social, cultural and political dimensions and the potential 
consequences of DSM will not be experienced evenly. As this paper demonstrates, DSM is an interdisciplinary 
issue. The confines of disciplinary norms must therefore be exceeded to facilitate a deeper understanding of both 
the practices of DSM and their consequences.   
1. Introduction 
In late 2017, it was widely reported by the Japanese government that 
its state-owned mining company – Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation (JOGMEC) – had successfully extracted zinc from the 
seabed 1,600 m deep off the coast of Okinawa. Professed to contain ‘the 
equivalent to Japan’s annual consumption’ of the metal, the Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry were quick to herald the 
seabed’s transformative potential (Japan times, 2017). A new political 
and economic imaginary was invoked in which a focus on deep-sea 
mining (DSM)1 could shift Japan from being a resource importer to 
being ‘a resource-producing nation’ (Japan times, 2017). In doing so, it 
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mobilised the unique ‘magical’ power of ‘new’ resources to transform 
the state in politically expedient ways (Coronil, 1997). The deep seabed 
is ‘conjured’ (Tsing, 2003) surfaced, scaled-up and subsumed into the 
material fabric of the nation state itself. This brings Japan, now under-
stood as a ‘resource nation’, into new relations with the emerging in-
ternational discourses and practices of DSM. 
Beyond Japan, the global DSM industry is moving towards the 
threshold of commercial viability. Therefore, there is a need to draw 
upon critical theoretical perspectives to better understand the complex 
debates being provoked. This is necessary in order to analyse the 
competing narratives of DSM and its practices across different sites and 
scales (local, national and global). This also requires a critical explora-
tion of the wide range of political actors (both human and non-human) 
involved with DSM and the associated tensions and relations that 
emerge. These perspectives can help us to better interrogate the indus-
try’s claims that DSM offers greater ‘sustainability’ and enable consid-
eration of the spatio-temporal dimensions involved. We aim to 
incorporate these conceptual aspects into an approach that is better 
attuned to apprehending DSM and which offers a means to go beyond 
the usual treatment given to understanding DSM by both the social 
sciences (which focus on stakeholders, cost-effectiveness, Environ-
mental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and discussions of the ‘precautionary 
principle’) and the natural sciences (and their focus on technology 
development and environmental impacts). These are of course impor-
tant, but miss some crucial perspectives found in the literature on 
resource politics more generally. We caution that the social sciences are 
not merely tools for assessing public and stakeholder acceptability, but 
rather require and deserve a central role in defining the purpose, nature 
and scope of commercial DSM. 
In this paper we develop an approach that seeks to diversify and 
broaden engagements with DSM and that is well-placed to deal with the 
political questions that emerge from mining on the seabed. We do so by 
breaking down our critical enquiry into four main areas of concern for 
DSM: 1) geography, 2) law, 3) political economy and 4) geopolitics. In 
each case, we focus critically on the discourse and the practices used to 
describe, mobilise and understand DSM. With regards to ‘discourse’, we 
argue first that the choice of language used in relation to DSM – 
including but not limited to ‘blue growth’, ‘resource frontier’ and 
‘resource security’ – has particular political ramifications for how DSM 
is accepted or contested by society, including in Japan. Secondly, we 
demonstrate that a common understanding of the language used by both 
the natural sciences and the social sciences is needed if we are to address 
DSM’s emerging challenges. As we illustrate, DSM is an interdisciplinary 
issue and the confines of disciplinary norms must be exceeded to un-
derstand its complexities. With regards to ‘practices’, we seek to high-
light the tensions between national and global forms of governance, 
regulation and deep-sea resource making. We draw upon the concept of 
‘edges’ – both as legally-produced lines that define the extent of a legal 
space, and as indivisible ‘edges’ that define the limits of social inclusions 
and exclusions – to illustrate that understanding the ocean as a political 
space is essential to discussions of DSM. We also seek to push back 
against the idea that DSM is only located in the deep sea. It is a process 
that, like other ocean-based practices cannot be considered as unteth-
ered from terrestrial land (see Peters and Steinberg, 2019). Therefore, 
DSM must instead be connected to coastal and landed politics at all 
scales. 
Although the approach we propose draws predominantly on theo-
retical concepts – from geography, law, political economy and geopol-
itics - we illustrate its applicability with empirical reference to, and 
examples from, the Japanese context. Although the world’s first com-
mercial mining lease was issued to the Solwara 1 project in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) in 2011, the contractor, Nautilus Minerals, has been un-
able to begin operations due to financing problems and is facing liqui-
dation. This has left Japan’s piloting of technology as the world’s only 
large-scale example of extractive activity to operate at such depths. 
We use this case both to highlight the questions that it raises and to offer 
a critical approach for thinking about their provocations. 
2. Geographies of deep-sea mining 
DSM has physical geographies. Geological processes occur over 
space and time and interact with the physical environment. Three types 
of deep seabed mineral deposits have attracted commercial interests: 
polymetallic sulphides, polymetallic nodules, and cobalt rich crusts (Van 
Dover, 2010). Childs (2020a) notes that these deposits are formed over 
different timeframes, and at different depths which has implications for 
the types of technologies utilised for extraction and for the political 
implications that arise. The unique (geo)physical characteristics of the 
marine environment (including depth and volume) introduce their own 
complexities when it comes to understanding, establishing and verifying 
claims to ‘ownership’ of deposits (see Campling and Colas, 2018). 
Depending on the exact seabed location and distribution of minerals, 
differing cultural, national and international norms and relations may 
also come into play (Filer and Gabriel, 2018; Roche and Bice, 2013). 
Moreover, DSM does not only involve the seabed. As an activity 
involving extraction, transportation and processing, DSM happens 
within – and has the potential to impact upon – the water column, the 
sea surface and the land (Childs, 2020a). DSM also has impacts on 
biodiversity, similar to those associated with other activities on the 
seabed (Gasparatos et al., 2016; Van Dover, 2011). Disturbances to 
ecosystems at (or near to) the seabed, such as noise pollution, increased 
water turbidity and the release of toxic materials, have the potential to 
alter the characteristics of the marine environment and hinder the 
movements and feeding of aquatic species (Gasparatos et al., 2016). 
Attention to the physical geographies of DSM is hence a valuable starting 
point in recognising that DSM is not a homogenous entity. DSM may 
have varying physical manifestations – with wide ranging social, polit-
ical and cultural implications – that vary between contexts. 
Human geography, alongside other disciplines in the social sciences, 
are crucial to understanding this heterogeneity. As Roche and Bice 
(2013) highlight, human interactions with minerals can vary across 
time, space, and scale and involve multiple, and sometimes conflicting 
actors. They hold that national or regional discourses on ownership, 
authority and cultural rights may conflict with those of local commu-
nities (Roche and Bice, 2013). Andrea Koschinsky et al. (2018) add that 
DSM projects may be experienced differently by different people 
depending on their proximity and relationship to that project, and that 
an understanding of how social representations of DSM are interpreted 
in different countries and contexts is still lacking (Childs, 2020b). When 
it comes to the governance of DSM, these points illustrate how the space 
and scale over which negotiations around social licences and affected 
communities are held are not ‘natural’; rather, they are constructed and 
defined by a breadth of actors including corporate representatives (Filer 
and Gabriel, 2018). Again, a long-established geographical tradition 
reminds us that the matter of what is included within and excluded from 
considerations of DSM is subject to social and political choice. These 
inclusions and exclusions are (re)produced and maintained, premised on 
diverse and unequal power relations. 
Recent work on DSM has begun to apply a critical view, informed by 
conceptual perspectives derived from the social sciences. Filer and 
Gabriel (2018), for instance, caution that established social licencing 
and impact assessment processes may be insufficient for facilitating the 
just operation of DSM. On this matter, Pierre- Yves Le Meur et al (2018: 
382) argue that “the recognition of DSM mining in all its dimensions, 
including cultural aspects, is needed to design a relevant, 
well-dimensioned policy tailored to the country’s needs”. Therefore, 
there is scope for scholarly engagement with DSM to augment extant 
work by tapping into the broader conceptual turn towards the sea within 
critical social science. Indeed, marine social sciences are crucial to 
sustainable oceans, advocating in particular for consideration of the 
embedded historical roots and cultural connections society has to the 
ocean (see Gilroy, 1993; Hau’ofa 1994). This turn towards marine social 
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science or ‘blue humanities’ has the effect of “rendering vast oceanic 
space into ontological place” (DeLoughrey, 2017: 32), again illustrating 
the analytical purchase geographical thought can provide in thinking 
through the place of DSM within a sustainable society. Reflection on 
these more profound questions around society’s relationship with the 
oceans will be of particular value as DSM projects come closer to 
fruition. 
Of course, DSM is not the only recent scholarly engagement with the 
ocean, seabed and subsurface. Recent works on subsea carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS), oceanic carbon sequestration, and deep-sea 
oil exploration all illustrate the value of deeper conceptual engage-
ment with the geographies of oceans as a complement to empirically 
focused social science (Bond et al., 2019; Mabon et al., 2017). For the 
Tomakomai CCS demonstration in northern Japan,2 Mabon et al. (2017) 
argue that fishers’ responses to the project – the first of its kind in Japan 
and one of only a few in the world – makes sense in the context of a much 
longer history of contestation with local industries over the protection of 
the seabed and water column. Kamishiro and Sato (2009) similarly find 
that among the Japanese public, attitudes to oceanic carbon sequestra-
tion are informed not only by techno-scientific risk, but by individuals’ 
own environmental ethics. Meanwhile, research into contestation over 
deep-sea oil exploration in New Zealand (Ruckstuhl et al., 2014) illus-
trates how technocratic and outcome-driven processes of social licenc-
ing can fail to account for traditional, indigenous and local knowledges 
and understandings of the deep sea. Common to the above examples is 
that even for research with a more applied focus, engagement with 
human geographies of the ocean yields additional insight and analytical 
purchase. 
In sum, DSM is not a single phenomenon, and cannot be understood 
by looking solely at the deep seabed, or through one disciplinary 
approach. Different deposits, and different parts of the DSM chain, have 
their own geographies and political economies. Likewise, relations with 
the different forms of DSM will depend on the social, cultural, and po-
litical context, in ways that cannot readily be assessed or quantified. 
Thinking about geographies can help to bring this richness and 
complexity to the fore. 
3. Critical legal approaches to DSM 
Legally, the ocean is a place of lines and limits. However, social 
science thinking enables discussions of DSM to move beyond this truism 
to understand how the law is applied to space and what the conse-
quences of these applications are. Descriptions of the modern law of the 
sea routinely begin with a map containing lines that denote key divisions 
across and through a three dimensional and volumetric space (see 
Fig. 1.). 
The borders of each of the above illustrated zones are defined by 
limits (for instance, at the 12 nautical mile point, where the territorial 
sea becomes the contiguous zone), and boundaries (for instance where 
one state’s territorial sea abuts the territorial sea of a neighbouring 
state). Notwithstanding contentious debates over where to draw 
boundaries at sea, the drawing of limits appears straightforward: once 
the baseline has been determined, one has merely to measure out the 
required number of nautical miles, draw a line, and hence a legal space is 
defined. Likewise, the key line dividing vertical layers in ocean-space – 
the line between the water column and the seabed – is understood as 
unproblematic. Geographic divisions are thus considered to provide the 
basis for the application of different legal regimes, facilitated by maps 
that use lines to divide the spaces in which a given legal regime will 
apply. 
This interpretation of the relationship between law and space, is 
contested by legal geographers. Geography, rather than occurring prior 
to the application of law, is actually the outcome of legal reasoning (see, 
for example, Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009; Blomley, 1994; Braverman 
et al., 2014; Delaney et al., 2001). This legal reasoning, however, is not 
without embedded power dynamics. As Alex Jeffrey (2020: 1) explains, 
“Law is a form of practice that is productive of an edge”. While Jeffrey is 
writing at one level about geographic edges – the legally produced lines 
on the ground that define the end of one legal space and the beginning of 
another – he argues that these spatial “edges” are inseparable from the 
“edges” that define the limits of social elements. This includes notions of 
jurisdictional authority, citizenship, and rights, as well as a host of other 
inclusions and exclusions that are defined through the practice of legal 
reasoning. Jeffrey argues that efforts to define the geographical limits of 
a place, which one might at first glance assume to be the starting point 
for determining the limits of legal authority, are, in fact, both a result 
and a means of reproducing legal power. Defining a space’s edge, and 
determining the standards by which that edge will be drawn, is imbri-
cated with efforts to define what that space is. 
In the seabed, this practice of constructing “edges” is apparent in the 
very designation of the continental shelf as a juridical place, and this 
must be considered in relation to DSM. The United Nations Convention 
on the Continental Shelf (United Nations, 1958a) defined the conti-
nental shelf as 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast 
but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters ad-
mits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas 
(Art. 1). 
Aside from being strikingly vague – the article was silent on whether 
the “exploitation of the natural resources” must be cost-effective given 
land-based alternatives, or on whether the limits of the continental shelf 
would need to be redrawn if the economic or technological environment 
for exploitation were to change – this definition is notable for what it 
was not. For a feature that is fundamentally geological, there is no 
mention of any geological criteria, nor is there a strict bathymetric cri-
terion: the continental shelf is simply the seabed that is beneath water 
that is “adjacent” to the territorial sea and that promises economic 
value.4 
A decade after the abovementioned Convention was promulgated, 
when the International Court of Justice considered a series of interre-
lated delimitation cases in the North Sea, a new definition was put 
forward, with the continental shelf being defined as “constitut[ing] a 
natural prolongation of [a state’s] land territory into and under the sea” 
(International Court of Justice, 1969: 72). Ironically, by redefining the 
continental shelf as a physical space, the ICJ established a basis for un-
derstanding it, more completely, as a political space, the implications of 
which must be recognised. After the ICJ ruling, the continental shelf was 
no longer defined as just the economically useful part of the seabed to 
which a state maintained exclusive rights through the vague principle of 
adjacency; rather it was a geological (and hence seemingly natural) 
extension of state territory. Shortly after the North Sea decision, this 
geologic thinking was extended further in UNCLOS, which defined “the 
2 The objective of the project ‘is to demonstrate the viability of a full CCS 
system, from CO2 capture to injection and storage’. One hundred thousand 
tonnes/year or more of CO2 is being injected and stored in offshore saline 
aquifers in the Tomakomai port area (Sawada et al., 2018:3).  
3 No state has exclusive rights in the Area and non-living resources are 
managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as the “common heritage 
of mankind” (CHM) (see Anderson, 2008; Lowe, 2012 for discussion of the 
CHM). The creation of the ISA to regulate this access has enabled the emergence 
of sovereign and private claims in this space (Campling and Colas, 2018: 781). 
4 In fact, the article is further hindered by the fact that the complementary 
1958 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea (United Nations, 1958b) 
never defines “the area of the territorial sea”, so there is no way of knowing if 
waters are “outside” that area. 
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continental shelf of a coastal State” as “the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin” (United Nations, 1982: Art. 76), as well as providing a 
series of technical geological and bathymetric criteria for determining 
where the “outer edge of the continental margin” lies.5 
In drawing a new set of “edges” around the continental shelf, law 
came to define the edge of the state. No longer was the continental shelf 
an adjacent area wherein a state could exercise exclusive control; the 
continental shelf was now a “natural prolongation” of the state’s terri-
tory and hence a seemingly natural extension of the state, even if the 
state’s powers in that “natural prolongation” were mediated by the 
presence of superjacent ocean. The stage was thus set for regulating DSM 
as an extension of land-based mining on state territory, as opposed to, 
for instance, approaching seabed mining from a starting point informed 
by management of the water column. In Japan, the Mining Act regulates 
mining activities in both terrestrial and marine areas (GOJ, 1950: Act 
no.289). 6 Despite its scope, the Mining Act primarily regulates 
land-based extraction as seabed mining was not considered to be feasible 
at the time of its drafting. This is illustrated by the Act’s stipulation that 
applications for mining rights cannot exceed an area of more than 350 
ha (3.5 square kilometres) (GOJ, 1950: Art.14). However, this size 
mining area does not satisfy most commercial DSM interests as seabed 
mineral deposits are often situated in wider areas than mineral deposits 
on land. In 2011 the Mining Act was updated to reflect this - allowing for 
an extension beyond this rule to enable the development of seabed 
mineral resources (GOJ 2011. Art 14(3)) – however, DSM remains pri-
marily regulated as an extension of terrestrial mining. The unique 
challenges that emerge from the practice of DSM and the associated 
questions of liability and legal responsibility in the event of unwanted 
consequences must, therefore, be considered. Current EIA law in Japan, 
for example, does not apply to DSM, raising questions of regulatory 
responsibility. 
The redefinition of the continental shelf as the extension of state 
territory set the stage for the regime that emerged for the seabed beyond 
the continental shelf: the Area, which was designated in UNCLOS as the 
CHM (United Nations, 1982: Art. 136). As a space beyond the limits of 
state authority, it was not at all self-evident that the seabed beyond the 
continental shelf should be governed in any way within the state system. 
Or perhaps if it were to be governed within the state system then it 
might, like the High Seas, be governed according to the minimal prin-
ciple that simply holds that all parties associate themselves with a single 
state and that they must not interfere with the actions of other state 
actors. Japan’s Act on Interim Measures for DSM, enacted in 1982, 
provides provisional regulations for mining activities by Japanese per-
sons within the Area. The Act, which was based on the assumption that 
DSM could be conducted freely by individual states, does not reference 
either UNCLOS or to the ISA. Yet, it does not infringe upon other state’s 
interests and freedoms in the High Seas. However, such regimes would 
fail to give prospective miners (whether associated with states, corpo-
rations, or other entities) the security of tenure required before investing 
in deep seabed production, a concern that has subsequently emerged 
when designing and implementing DSM regulatory systems in areas of 
state jurisdiction as well, and which reflects underlying power relations. 
Japan’s interim measures also establish regulations regarding compen-
sation for environmental and other damage incurred in Japan as a result 
of DSM. Japan is currently looking to the ISA for guidance on these 
measures: if the ISA adopts development rules in the upcoming Legal 
and Technical Commission (due to take place at the 26th session of the 
ISA in July 2020), Japan will look to reflect these in its national legis-
lation (GOJa 2018). 
To this end, and building on the precedent established on the con-
tinental shelf, the Area was designated as a land-like space, in which 
swathes could be licensed to private or public firms for exclusive 
extraction. Following the revisions of the Part XI Implementation 
Fig. 1. Maritime divisions and rights to resources in the seabed3 (NOAA, 2020: 22).  
5 UNCLOS Art. 76 also grants states exclusive right to the seabed out to 200 
nautical miles in cases where the continental shelf does not extend that far.  
6 DSM activities in areas under national jurisdiction of Japan are, however, 
also subject to existing acts relating to maritime safety and marine environ-
mental protection. 
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Agreement (United Nations, 1994), the only significant international 
component characterising resource extraction in the Area is a provision 
that the entire system be managed by the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA), which, in turn, is governed by State Parties to the Convention. The 
ISA is also responsible for the provision that a percentage of revenues is 
returned to the international community as compensation for 
land-locked states that may lose income due to seabed-based produc-
tion. However, the ability of these states to claim compensation will 
likely be uneven, further reflecting unequal power relations. 
As this section has discussed, regulatory systems cannot be under-
stood by simply looking at how the law is applied to a space (in this case 
the ocean). Engagement with critical legal studies illustrates the value of 
understanding what ocean space is and how legally produced lines 
define social factors. These include matters of jurisdictional authority, 
inclusion and exclusion and how power imbalances are not only main-
tained but reproduced. These considerations are essential to under-
standing the complexities of DSM. As legal geography highlights, 
attention should be given to the relationships between the ocean, people 
and relevant social institutions (Bartel et al., 2013: 340). With the ocean 
being designated as a land-like space that is ripe for DSM, it is imperative 
that emergent discussions recognise that the ocean and associated sites 
of extraction are not only physical spaces but also political ones. 
4. Political economy 
With the ocean defined as a political space, with economic potential 
therein, conventional economic paradigms have framed interest in DSM 
as a solution to resource scarcity and an increasing demand for minerals 
(Hoagland et al., 2010; WTO 2010). In fact, the 2019 Deep Sea Mining 
Summit website argued that, “as demand for base metals and minerals 
surges ever beyond what our land is able to provide, new technological 
and technical developments are helping to drive forward this new in-
dustry” (The Deep Sea Mining Summit 2019). However, interests in DSM 
reflect more than rational economic behaviour and, as this section 
highlights, the inherent social and political drivers must therefore be 
analysed. In doing so, this enables insight into how DSM, and the de-
mand for DSM, is situated beyond the site of extraction. 
The framing of the ocean – as pristine, as a hazard and/or as a 
resource – and the discourse used when discussing DSM offer insight into 
the drivers behind extraction. Terrestrial shortages and the perceived 
‘rarity’ of resources often have little to do with a mineral’s scarcity and 
more to do with the absence of sites of extraction which are perceived as 
being without social or economic contention (see Klinger, 2018). The 
offshore and perceived ‘remoteness’ of the ocean (in dominant un-
derstandings within Western Europe and North America at least) enable 
the deep sea to be framed as an uncontentious space: the absence of 
human habitation appearing to reduce or erase potential social or 
environmental consequences. Thus, the ocean is reframed as a resource 
(Hannigan, 2016: 13) with agendas such as the blue economy legiti-
mising extraction under the guise of development. Historical imagina-
tions that frame the ocean as space ripe for exploration and exploitation 
(see Rozwadowski, 2012:18), are propagated by blue growth discourse 
that (re)opens the ocean to imaginations of adventure, wherein new 
opportunities can be harnessed, and potential capital accumulated. With 
this framing comes the need for new governance and regulatory 
frameworks and institutions (Havice, 2018) which emerge from both 
state and non-state interests.7 Therefore, demand for DSM must be 
considered not only economically, but also politically. 
Given that interests in DSM extend beyond rational economic 
behaviour, it is important to locate mining, and the drivers of mining, 
beyond the deposit. With the advent of “expectations from the UN 
Member States to bring management of their EEZs into line with inter-
national best practice” (Winder and Le Heron, 2017: 9), countries are 
increasingly engaging with blue economy initiatives under the guidance 
of external actors – including development actors and the private sector 
– with their own political and economic interests. Under such initiatives, 
new markets, including those for DSM, are opened with financiers 
supporting the state in the planning of these spaces and associated new 
markets (Havice and Zalik, 2019: 231). These economies are “being 
planned” under the auspices of external actors (Winder and Le Heron, 
2017: 4). As such, the involvement of private corporations and finan-
ciers is integral to discussions of the marine scape as its unique (geo) 
physical characteristics require access to and possession of certain 
technologies, knowledges and finance. 
Corporations and indeed associated external states have the power to 
shape how DSM is approached and occurs, both within the EEZ and the 
Area, particularly as investment is speculative and involves varying 
degrees of financial risk. As Jennifer Silver and Lisa Campbell (2018) 
argue, the commodification of the oceans is a product of speculation. 
This speculation can generate ‘contingent and unexpected outcomes’ 
(Campling and Colas, 2018: 77). When discussing DSM, it would 
therefore be astute to recognise the complexity of the mechanisms that 
finance extractive projects (Havice and Zalik, 2019) and the subsequent 
embedded power dynamics that accompany such exploration and 
exploitation. In the case of Japan, JOGMEC is a state-owned company. 
Unlike commercial operations, which would need to identify funding 
opportunities and obtain the required licences, JOGMEC has the latitude 
to develop extractive projects without such restrictions. However, this is 
not the case for all states that are considering exploitation. Recognising 
uneven power relations between states and external corporations is 
therefore paramount given the high costs and technological re-
quirements of DSM exploration and extraction. The ownership and 
creation of knowledges relating to data and technology also reproduce 
uneven power dynamics, not just in terms of marine mineral extraction, 
but in terms of who gets to know the sea (Childs, 2020a). 
The study of the political economy of any form of resource extrac-
tion, including DSM, must also understand how corporations operate 
both internally and externally to society. While the offshore location of 
DSM may appear to reduce the potential for social implications 
including the marginalisation of adjacent communities, claims to legit-
imacy in the sea do exist both through formal mechanisms of interna-
tional law (e.g. rights to EEZs) and through informal customary claims 
(e.g. by indigenous and coastal groups that have long claimed the ocean, 
including the seabed, as part of their domain) (see Childs, 2020b). 
However, these claims may be subject to reduced capacity, exacerbated 
by the remoteness of the site of extraction. As discussed previously, the 
political economy of DSM also needs to be understood relative to the 
historical context within which it is situated. Histories of colonisation, 
resource nationalism, and market-oriented liberalisation shape 
contemporary extraction (Power et al., 2016). In the case of Namibia for 
example, the potential for marine phosphate mining8 within the coun-
try’s EEZ cannot be understood without analysis of the embedded 
structures from its history of colonial rule. Namibia’s experience of 
colonialism and the effects of apartheid rule continue to present chal-
lenges to sovereign rights and the accrual of rent from extractive pro-
jects. Despite the state being positioned as an ‘abstract landlord’ of 
independent Namibia, there remain similarities between colonial and 
present-day relations (see Carver, 2019). This includes the exclusion of 
groups and individuals from discussions of and practices pertaining to 
‘sovereignty, territory and mineral resources’ (Emel et al., 2011: 77). 
Similarly, continued reliance on external investment has, in some 
7 Exploitation in the ocean is “shaped by both socio-political contestation and 
cooperation (involving state agencies, trade unions, companies and interna-
tional organisations, among other bodies) over the occupation, delimitation and 
appropriation of oceanic resources”(Campling and Colas, 2018:777). 
8 Marine phosphate mining is projected to occur at comparatively shallow 
depths (180–300 m - although deposits occur at depths of down to 800 m) than 
the DSM practices discussed in this paper. 
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contexts, perpetuated the potential for elite accrual of rent from 
extractive projects (Auty, 2007). While traditionally discussed in rela-
tion to terrestrial based extraction, concerns have been raised about the 
potential for political elites to accrue rent from extraction in the ocean 
(see Carver, 2019). Scholarship on DSM must therefore adequately 
engage with relevant contexts. This is also imperative within discussions 
of DSM outside of state’s EEZs. Here the power and capacity of states to 
negotiate extraction and the technological and financial ability of states 
to exploit is uneven. 
As with terrestrial mining, understanding how corporations operate 
within a society extends beyond the moment of extraction. All stages of 
extraction and production are essential components of the political 
economy of DSM. This includes waste,9 which should be treated as a 
central component and not merely as a residual consideration or an 
afterthought. Methods of extraction are projected to produce plumes 
and involve the discharge of tailings and waste back into the ocean and, 
as scholars such as Boschen et al. (2013) have recognised, the environ-
mental implications of waste stemming from DSM must be considered. 
While proponents argue that the waste and tailings arising from DSM 
will likely be lower than those caused by terrestrial mining due to de-
posits from the former being of a higher grade and closer to the seabed, it 
remains imperative to process and store the resultant potentially haz-
ardous waste for which there is currently no alternative use (Mclellan, 
2015; Motoori et al., 2018). In Japan existing DSM regulations constrain 
the release of waste water if, as is common with sulphide deposits on the 
seabed, it contains high levels of arsenic (Motoori et al., 2015). While it 
is anticipated that this legislation will evolve to allow the release of 
wastewater, currently the use of high performance purification tech-
nology remains crucial to any efforts to extract. 
It is important to recognise that waste is not just a technical issue (see 
Moore, 2011). The type(s) of waste, as well as decisions as to their 
definitions and how and where they are disposed of, are inherently 
political (Moore, 2011: 143). Waste from DSM will occur throughout the 
process – from extraction to production, manufacturing, consumption 
and finally to disposal – and new governance regimes will emerge 
(Knapp, 2016: 1890–91). Japan, for example, are discussing how to 
incorporate waste from DSM into their Marine Pollution Control Law 
(GOJa 2018). Discourse on DSM must avoid perpetuating the idea that 
‘waste can be removed’ and instead acknowledge the ‘uncertainties’ 
associated with waste (see Balayannis, 2020:16). The management and 
disposal of waste is therefore important, and the latter is an uneven 
process that can result in the marginalisation of communities (Moore, 
2011: 143; Pulido, 2000). Questions around who will experience and 
bear the consequences of waste from DSM must, therefore, be addressed. 
As Nunn (2018) and Davies (2019)) highlight, inequalities and colonial 
logics are embedded in the production, processing and disposal of waste, 
the effects of which are unevenly shared, extending colonial practices 
into the ‘intergenerational future’ (Murphy, 2017:497). This makes 
feminist and anticolonial studies of paramount importance to the ge-
ographies of waste: including unpacking issues of inequality, (in)justice, 
lived experience and scale. Additionally, the offshore location of DSM 
must not blind one to the onshore waste associated with the production 
process. The ocean cannot be untethered from terrestrial territories, as 
the beneficiation of minerals may occur on land. In Japan, the 
requirement to secure resources conflicts with national and local in-
terests over the storage, release and impact of DSM waste. Meanwhile, 
current solutions (such as importing concentrate or recycling waste 
domestically) serve only to displace these impacts (Motoori et al., 2018). 
The political economy of mining waste should therefore be considered 
across the process, challenging the imagination of the ocean as a pristine 
site of extraction existing solely offshore in isolation from the land. 
As illustrated, the drivers of DSM cannot be fully understood by 
engaging only with classical, market led, economic rationale. Analysing 
the discourse of extraction offers insight into the political drivers behind 
DSM, illustrating that the involvement of actors, including those beyond 
the state, must be recognised. Financiers and private corporations are 
increasingly involved in the creation of new markets, reflecting the 
imperative of locating mining, and the drivers of mining, beyond the 
deposit. The embedded power dynamics in, and environmental conse-
quences of, DSM practices must also be considered. This prompts 
questions about the inequalities that are implicit in the production of 
sub-marine resource (both on and offshore). Such questions highlight 
the need to explore the contextual locations of DSM, allowing for their 
equally heterogenous effects to be critically analysed. 
5. Geopolitics 
While the sea has been framed as a ‘lucrative location for the 
extraction of natural resources’, it can also be understood as a ‘theatre of 
geopolitical rivalry and domination’ (Campling and Colas, 2018:777). 
The geopolitics of DSM, like many of its other components, are multi-
faceted, involving multinational corporations, the state, civil society 
groups both locally and globally, alongside more-than-human forces 
such as the deep ocean itself. Drawing upon recent work from political 
ecology that has understood state intervention as relational to other 
forms of non-human agency (Harris, 2017), this section highlights the 
notion that historic and geographic specificities matter for understand-
ing the contemporary political relations of DSM. In all of the examples 
given below, the geopolitics of DSM features ‘scalar practices’ (Moore, 
2008). The work that scale does – how it affects social power relations 
and institutions – must therefore be taken as a ‘starting point’ (Moore, 
2008: 218), as opposed to considering scale as a ‘concrete thing’ (see 
Paasi, 2004: 537). In short, not only is DSM’s geopolitics produced by 
different institutions, but it also has different effects according to how 
different political actors relate to each other across the socio-natural 
world. As feminist political geographers have long noted, attending to 
questions of scale is vital to unpacking the ways in which power operates 
and circulates (Massaro and Williams, 2013). These considerations 
enable the tracing of power, oppression and resistance that exists at, and 
between, multiple scales, sites and contexts (Massaro and Williams, 
2013:567; see also Dowler and Sharp, 2001). As Hyndman (2001:219), 
notes, this is not promoting a new theory of geopolitics, but instead 
encourages a comprehensive analysis of the violence that ‘traverses 
public/private distinctions.’ In the context of DSM, this approach helps 
to tether what initially appear as ‘distant places and problems together’ 
(Massaro and Williams, 2013: 56). Firstly, it reveals that the deep sea is 
intricately connected to issues on land and vice versa. Secondly, it il-
lustrates how state actors, corporations and international organisations 
are inextricably connected to communities and individuals. 
This is, of course, not to say that the state is not important in shaping 
the geopolitics of deep oceans. This can be seen clearly in contemporary 
conflicts over sovereignty in the South China Sea between China (Singh 
and Yamamoto, 2016), the USA and regional states, or the now noto-
rious instance of Russia’s planting of a flag on the Artic seabed in 2007 
(see Dodds, 2010). These tensions can also be observed in the case of 
Okinotorishima, an uninhabited atoll located roughly halfway between 
Taiwan and Guam, which has been a subject of controversy between the 
Chinese and Japanese governments. Constituted of two barren rocks, 
located 1400 yards apart, Okinotorishima is visible at high tide less than 
two feet above the surface (Yamamoto and Esteban, 2014). The Japa-
nese government argues that Okinotorishima is an island (Xue, 2012), 
and one that affords Japan a claim to the waters around it and the right 
to exploit natural resources therein. While the Chinese government 
recognises Japanese sovereignty over Okinotorishima, it maintains that 
it is a rock, and not an island, and therefore does not recognise Japan’s 
9 While this paper focuses primarily on discussions of physical waste, the 
noise pollution associated with DSM practices must also be recognised. 
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claim to an EEZ around it (Yoshikawa, 2007).10 These claims are further 
complicated by the rising sea level, which threatens low-lying islands 
(Esteban et al., 2018; Yamamoto and Esteban, 2009). However, Japan 
has already invested in the protection of Okinotorishima through the 
construction of circular blocks of steel, concrete barriers and the 
planting of corals around it (Hogg, 2007). Moreover, sea level rises will 
likely lead to larger-scale investment in protection works to ensure that 
Japan’s claim to an EEZ around Okinotorishima remains. 
For DSM more specifically, the tensions between states are clear in 
the narratives that define much of the global exploration efforts 
currently witnessed in the search for deep sea metals and minerals. A UK 
parliament report explicitly suggests deep-sea mining as a way to reduce 
the dependency on China for the import of critical rare earth elements 
(POST, 2015: 1–2). In Japan, it has been suggested by scholars that the 
extraction of copper from the deep seabed is a central part of the 
country’s ‘resource security strategy’ in its shift away from being a net 
resource importer (Motoori et al., 2018). Japan’s dependency on 
domestically scarce resources, including minerals and fossil fuels, has 
exposed it to supply risks that have driven the development of numerous 
innovations in more efficient consumption. Concurrently, Japan’s en-
ergy security strategy focuses on the provision or production of re-
sources domestically, as well as the increase of investment in companies 
and deposits external to Japan. However, the opportunity to domesti-
cally source metals in its EEZ remains alluring to Japan, despite its 
recognition that exploitation requires careful consideration (Motoori 
et al., 2018). The presence of offshore deposits in its EEZ has led Japan to 
undertake extensive exploration and development efforts for DSM as 
well as for methane hydrate deposits as a source of natural gas. DSM also 
appears in Japan’s fifth Strategic Energy Plan (GOJb, 2018). 
At the heart of these debates is an implicit focus on the idea of ‘ter-
ritory’ – to first fix it as a factual object and then to assert the means to 
control it. Territory emerges as a ‘political technology’ which comprises 
various techniques deployed to ‘measure … control and manage terrain’ 
(Elden, 2013: 17). However, while there are several exceptions (see 
Bruun, 2020; Peters et al., 2018; Squire, 2016 for example) most ren-
derings of territory rest on a landed, terrestrial bias and do little to ac-
count for the three-dimensional geophysical specificities thrown up by 
the deep-ocean seabed. As has been asked elsewhere, ‘how is DSM’s 
politics to be considered in terms of its predominant definition’ (Childs, 
2020a: 20)? Is the seabed to be thought about as ‘territory’ in the same 
way as land, for example? In addition to addressing the question of what 
territory, in the context of the seabed, is or is not, is the question of how it 
is performed or made politically certain – its territoriality- and who has 
the power to define this process. In Papua New Guinea, for example, 
human actors such as the community groups living closest to the sites of 
proposed DSM activity are able to make particular claims on the deep 
seabed (Childs, 2019). For local communities, the sea is a space imbued 
with spiritual meaning – a stance that conflicts with corporations 
seeking to appropriate the sea floor (Childs, 2020b). Meanwhile, the 
notion of adjacency rights suggests that ‘the people living on land 
contiguous to marine resources ought to have priority in developing 
these resources’ (Foley and Mather, 2019). At the same time, corporate 
actors operating in that same ‘territory’ place great emphasis on the 
remoteness, volatility and mobility of the seabed and its associated 
fauna in order to destabilise such claims and to legitimise the rights of 
their involvement (Childs, 2019). The question of territoriality, and 
these competing ‘terraqueous’ claims (Campling and Colas, 2018:776), 
especially for ‘the Area’ (the seabed beyond the EEZ), renders these 
tensions over sovereignty even more ‘unsettled’ (Havice, 2018) yet 
nonetheless central to political debate over DSM. 
Discussions of how to apportion and manage submarine ‘territories’ 
have also emerged in reference to the establishment of ‘protected areas’ 
in both states’ EEZs and in the Area. Ecologically and Biologically Sig-
nificant Areas (EBSAs) – areas that are defined as integral to the func-
tioning of the ocean – have been designated in areas outside national 
jurisdictions and are coordinated through the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Concurrently, each member state is responsible for defining 
EBSAs in its own EEZ. However, these EBSAs exist merely as biologically 
determined definitions and are not subject to legislative measures. 
Despite this ambiguity, the Japanese government has defined three 
types of EBSA: the coastal area, the offshore surface area and the deep- 
sea floor.11 Japan has announced that it will establish Marine Protected 
Areas (MPAs)12 on the deep-sea floor EBSA near the Ogasawara Islands. 
However, the location and extent of these prospective MPAs have not 
been disclosed at the time of writing. Geoparks and Biosphere Reserves 
(BR) have also been established in Japan with the aim of protecting 
some areas of the EEZ, while the surrounding areas are targeted for 
resource use. Through Geoparks, such as the Oki Islands Geopark, the 
Japanese government aims to conserve unique geodiverse areas13 (see 
Eder, 2008) to encourage the preservation of geological, biological and 
cultural resources of a territory (Brilha, 2018). Japan is currently dis-
cussing the potential to install a BR or a Geopark on the deep sea floor, 
which will incorporate both DSM and MPAs. However, it remains un-
clear as to how adjacency rights for contiguous communities will be 
negotiated if this is established. 
Aside from the kind of ‘ocean grabbing’ (Barbesgaard, 2018) seen in 
the emergent DSM industry, other political dynamics are occurring in 
which the state plays a key, yet relational role. DSM is witnessing new 
moves firstly towards ‘modes of resource and environmental certifica-
tion that supersede state sovereignty’ and secondly, towards ‘the 
continuing hybridization of neoliberal modes of environmental gover-
nance’ wrought by public–private partnership (Bridge, 2014: 118). Both 
of these moves can be seen in the context of Japan. In the first instance, 
Japan has been at the forefront of trying to develop new ISO standards 
for the exploitation and environmental management of DSM. 14These 
proposals involve the negotiation of different political norms across 
several countries, notably China and the UK, and have attempted to 
develop standards for the quality of seawater, for the observation of 
deep-sea fauna, and for long-term environmental surveying practices 
(JAMSTEC, 2017). As of January 2020, Working Group 4 of the ISO 
TC8/SC13 on marine technology is developing seven standards that will 
contribute to Marine Environmental Impact Assessments. Japanese sci-
entists have proposed four of these seven standards: General technical 
requirement on marine environment impact assessment (ISO/AWI 
23730), Long-term in-situ image based surveys in deep sea environ-
ments (ISO/AWI 23731), General Protocol for Observation of meiofau-
nal community (ISO/AWI 23732) and On-board bioassay to monitor 
seawater quality using delayed fluorescence of microalga (ISO/AWI 
23734). Workshops have also been held by the ISA drawing upon the 
10 While rocks are like islands in that they are ‘naturally formed area[s] of 
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide’ UNCLOS Art. 121 
(1), islands can ‘sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’ 
(UNCLOS, supra note 2, at Art. 121(3)) (UN 1982). 
11 In order to achieve Aichi Biodiversity Target 10, Japan is required to 
establish an MPA that is equivalent to 1.6 percent of its EEZ, in addition to the 
MPA that is mainly in coastal areas.  
12 Japan has attempted to balance conservation and resource use in its MPAs. 
This can be seen in the case of Shiretoko National Park, where the interaction 
between the terrestrial peninsular area and the surrounding marine area is 
recognised by the government and supports the notion of ‘adjacency rights.’ 
Fishermen have been central to the establishment of its Multi Use Integrated 
Marine Management Plan and their voluntary efforts to improve marine con-
servation contributed to Shiretoko being designated as a World Heritage Site in 
2005 (Makino et al., 2009; Matsuda et al., 2018).  
13 Geodiversity is defined by the presence of “geological heritage types or 
qualitative characteristics of [a] unique geological environment” (Ruban 2017: 
103).  
14 The ISO standard justifies that the method used is a “recognised scientific” 
method (Seta, 2019). 
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experiences of several of the countries most invested in the idea of DSM 
(ISA, 2019). Engagement from other states is likely to increase as more 
countries consider exploitation. In the second instance, and as a 
reminder of the public–private collaborations necessary to DSM, nego-
tiating and understanding the imperatives of state and corporate in-
terests will be central to the future expansion of the industry. 
Geopolitical approaches to DSM enable a focus on state actors, but 
also challenge the notion that they are the sole unit of analysis in 
geopolitical thinking. Turning towards a posthuman geopolitics 
(Dittmer, 2014), both material forces (the things that the seabed and 
deep-ocean environments do) and more-than-human spiritualties will be 
important to the emergent politics. For the question of materiality, DSM 
deposits develop at vastly different rates, thus ushering-in different re-
sponses to the question of environmental impact. Similarly, defining 
‘serious harm’, a key legal concept which is partly used to determine 
who bears responsibility for DSM’s unwanted consequences, emerges 
from the conjunction of legal procedures, technological approaches and 
geophysical realties of mineral distribution and occurrence (Levin et al., 
2016). On the second question of spirituality, several instances of DSM 
projects colliding with the belief systems of proximate community 
groups have already been witnessed. Childs (2019) aforementioned 
research, in PNG, has demonstrated how the potential impacts of DSM 
upon the bodies of spirits that both move through and transcend 
deep-ocean space were regarded as the most important perceived risk 
(Childs, 2020b). These concerns have been central to the politico-legal 
challenge to the PNG state forwarded by communities. Related de-
bates have also been seen in New Zealand where offshore mining is 
debated in the context of Maori cosmological understandings of space 
echoing similar situations that have occurred around land-based 
extraction (see Carre~no, 2017, Theriault, 2017; Taussig, 2010). 
Because seafloor massive sulphide deposits are predominantly associ-
ated with the Pacific ‘ring of fire’, such political flashpoints are likely to 
endure in the future. The questions of belief are no less relevant for other 
deposit types found outside of EEZs and add complexity to the often 
cited ‘sovereignty game’ (Hannigan, 2016). The deep-ocean space and 
its spiritual inhabitants must therefore be considered in relational terms. 
Finally, reflecting the ‘critical’ turn in geopolitics, the linguistic and 
creative representations of DSM are pivotal in shaping its politics. This 
approach is centred less on the political ‘facts’ of DSM (i.e. where the 
deposits are, who controls them, how revenues are to be distributed, and 
so on) and more on the language and images used to describe them (see 
Medby, 2020). Already we are seeing how the trope of ‘sustainability’ is 
used to justify the exploitation of both conventional and rare earth el-
ements alike (for the construction of everything from wind turbines to 
electric car batteries). Yet this kind of language stands at odds with those 
critics who point to its ‘unsustainability’ (in terms of the continuing 
expansion of the extractive frontier). Depending on who is speaking, 
DSM is scripted as a ‘new solution’ or a continuing case of ‘business as 
usual’. In short, from this perspective the real tensions are between the 
ways in which DSM is represented rather than between the things that it 
does or does not do. Clearly, creative practice (film and fine art, for 
example) has as much of a role to play for articulating a lexis for DSM as 
does the written word (such as scientific and academic reports and 
journalism) (Childs, 2020b). Finding a vocabulary that speaks across the 
disciplines in academia would allow equal room for the broad range of 
worldviews pertaining to the deep-ocean, and as such, negotiating po-
litical differences across political institutions from the supra-to sub-na-
tional is vital. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have highlighted the importance of considering the 
social sciences in discussions on DSM and in blurring the disciplinary 
‘edges’ that come to define its place within contemporary scholarship. 
With DSM moving towards commercial viability, critical engagement 
with this emerging practice must go beyond the usual treatment given to 
understanding mining on the seabed, which is often centred upon 
questions of stakeholder perceptions and social licencing. DSM brings 
with it complex debates that critical social sciences are well places to 
address. This paper has proposed an approach that is well-placed to 
navigate and better understand the political questions that emerge from 
mining on the seabed. By engaging with geography, law, political 
economy and geopolitics we have demonstrated how the social sciences 
are necessary to analyse not only the narratives of DSM, but also the 
actors involved and the consequential tensions and conflicts that arise. 
These perspectives also enable interrogation of claims that seabed 
mining offers greater ‘sustainability’ than terrestrial mining does. 
Unpacking the geographies of DSM reveals its complexities and 
cautions against perceiving DSM as a singular phenomenon. DSM cannot 
be understood by attending to its physical dimensions alone, important 
as they are. Indeed, as this paper has demonstrated, mining the deep 
seabed is both underpinned by, and produces, a range of social, cultural, 
and political dimensions. Furthermore, individuals’ experiences and 
interpretations of DSM are not uniform – they are contextual and 
dependent upon a range of unevenly distributed social and political 
factors. While this paper has drawn on empirical examples from Japan 
(and to an extent PNG and Namibia), we caution against extrapolating 
these cases. DSM and its associated relations will vary, and its’ different 
practices and contexts must be considered in any analysis. Importantly, 
the geographies of DSM also highlight that the practice and its’ com-
plexities cannot be simply located at sea. DSM, in all its manifestations, 
is reliant on landed, terrestrial, practices and for some communities, it 
transcends both land and sea to be experienced and understood at a 
spiritual and embodied scale. 
These complex and multi-scalar questions require a more holistic 
approach then has been the norm thus far in research on DSM. As the 
second section of this paper highlighted, in order to understand the 
emergent politics of DSM, we must first define what the ocean space and 
seabed are. While geographic divisions – facilitated by lines on maps 
that divide spaces - are considered as the basis for the application of 
different legal regimes, they are not politically neutral. They create 
‘edges’ that define geographical limits, shaping notions of jurisdictional 
authority, citizenship, and questions of ownership as they do so (Jeffrey, 
2020). These geographical delineations both result from, and unevenly 
reproduce legal power. In considering these spaces to be not just phys-
ical but also political spaces, the complexities and implications of these 
socially constructed lines can be understood. This enables analysis of 
how notions of rights (including to extraction), authority and other in-
clusions and exclusions related to DSM are defined through the practice 
of legal reasoning. 
While DSM is framed as a (more sustainable) solution to resource 
scarcity, these discussions must go beyond traditional economic ratio-
nale. The analysis of discourse associated with DSM practices can offer 
insight into the drivers behind extraction, including those that exist 
beyond the site of the deposit. By approaching DSM through a political 
economic lens, we caution that an appreciation of a given context and a 
recognition of potential power imbalances within it is necessary. 
Considering the political economy of DSM also highlights the imperative 
of analysing all of the stages of extraction and production involved. This 
includes waste which must not be overlooked: it pushes back against the 
idea that seabed mining is located only in the deep sea. The social sci-
ences can also help to highlight the actors involved with DSM. While 
multinational corporations, the state and civil society groups are 
involved, it is from a combination of both human and more-than-human 
forces that the politics of DSM emerge. The geopolitics of DSM are 
produced not only by different institutions but also in accordance with 
how different political actors relate to each other across the socio- 
ecological world. In recognising this, we should also appreciate that 
understanding historical and geographical specificities are crucial to 
comprehending the contemporary political relations of mining on the 
seabed. This recognition is vital if colonial underpinnings of DSM and 
uneven power relations are to be brought to the fore. As with other forms 
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of extraction, the potential consequences of DSM will not be experienced 
homogenously. 
In the light of the tensions, contradictions, and complexities of DSM, 
the paper concludes by arguing that an interdisciplinary approach is 
vital to facilitate a deeper understanding of both the practices of DSM 
and their consequences. As we have demonstrated DSM must be un-
derstood as a practice with extensive social, cultural, and political re-
lations and implications. This paper has taken a step in this direction but 
is limited in scope, leaving several areas in need of further research. 
Research must engage with the finer scalar levels of DSM. While Childs 
(2020b: 126) offers an example of the potential of how creative practice 
can ‘give voice to marginalised communities’, the experiences of DSM – 
both at a community and an, individual scale – warrant further atten-
tion. This would provide an opportunity to diversify understandings and 
experiences of DSM. Such an endeavour would centralise actions taken 
by the individuals and communities that are resisting, challenging and 
rewriting the socio-political relations that underpin DSM (Massaro and 
Williams, 2013:567). 
Further engagement with feminist and decolonial approaches are 
necessary to unpack the intersectional power dynamics that are implicit 
within practices of DSM. As Hyndman (2001:219) asserts, these ap-
proaches can help to identify the ‘geographically and historically 
contingent practices’ that enable and promote DSM. While such ap-
proaches may initially appear antagonistic within natural science 
discourse, it is precisely this juxtaposition that makes them integral to 
analysing the current practices and trajectories of DSM. These ap-
proaches elucidate the diverse ways in which DSM is known, practiced, 
and resisted. By highlighting the power dynamics and gendered repre-
sentations involved in creating, prioritising, and circulating knowledges 
of DSM, these approaches can help to ensure inclusion of marginalised, 
‘more than scientific’ modes of knowledges and non-dominant narra-
tives. Similarly, questions must be asked about the ownership of, and 
uneven power relations pertaining to, knowledge and data related to 
DSM practices and the ocean itself. This has important implications for 
discussions of knowledge systems in relation to DSM and to highlighting 
issues of vulnerability, social justice and ownership. 
Finally, there is also scope, as alluded to in the paper, to broaden the 
methods through which scholarship engages with DSM. As Childs 
(2020b) has demonstrated in his research on PNG, participatory 
research and film have provided insights that would otherwise remain 
obscured. Working with artists, undertaking creative practice, or 
exploring the processes through which creative responses to DSM are 
created can reveal ‘politics in action’ and illustrate the often-overlooked 
relations between ‘human and non-human’ actors (Hawkins, 2011: 473, 
see also Hawkins et al., 2015). The diverse range of methodological 
practices in the social sciences offers a wealth of opportunities to engage 
with the new relations and political questions that are emerging from 
DSM. 
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